Costly external finance and labor market dynamics

被引:21
作者
Chugh, Sanjay K. [1 ]
机构
[1] Boston Coll, Kiel Inst World Econ, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167 USA
关键词
Credit frictions; Financial accelerator; Risk shocks; Labor search and matching; Volatility puzzle; Business cycle modeling; BUSINESS CYCLES; AGENCY COSTS; JOB DESTRUCTION; WAGE STICKINESS; ASSET PRICES; NET WORTH; UNEMPLOYMENT; SEARCH; FLUCTUATIONS; EQUILIBRIUM;
D O I
10.1016/j.jedc.2013.08.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the role of agency frictions and costly external finance in cyclical labor market dynamics, with a focus on how credit-market frictions may amplify aggregate TFP shocks. The main result is that aggregate TFP shocks lead to large fluctuations of labor market quantities if the model is calibrated to the empirically observed countercyclicality of the finance premium. A financial accelerator mechanism thus amplifies labor market fluctuations by rendering rigidity in real wage dynamics. In contrast, if the finance premium is procyclical, which the model can be parameterized to accommodate, amplification is absent, and labor-market fluctuations display the Shimer (2005) puzzle. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2882 / 2912
页数:31
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