A model of the supply of executives for outside directorships

被引:33
作者
Conyon, Martin J. [1 ]
Read, Laura E. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
corporate governance; firm performance; boards of directors;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.08.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Why do firms allow their executives to accept outside directorships? Are firms acting in the best interests of their shareholders by allowing them to do so? We develop a theoretical model where accepting an outside directorship alters the CEO's effect on the value of the home firm. Our model illustrates that executives will choose to spend more time on external directorships than is optimal for the home firm. Our theoretical model is consistent with other recent empirical finance research on the effects of external directorships. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:645 / 659
页数:15
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