Litigating the "Public Interest" in the Gilded Age: Common Law Business Regulation by Nineteenth-Century State Attorneys General

被引:2
作者
Nolette, Paul [1 ]
机构
[1] Marquette Univ, Milwaukee, WI 53233 USA
关键词
state attorneys general; legal history; business regulation; common law; American political economy; American political development;
D O I
10.1057/pol.2012.8
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Heeding recent calls to explore the contributions of creative political actors other than federal judges to the process of American legal development, this article examines the role of state attorneys general (SAGs) during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Consistent with recent revisionist accounts concerning the extent of government power during this era of supposed "laissez-faire," I find that SAGs creatively employed common law legal theories to address the emerging industrial and corporate order Through a review of state court cases and newspaper accounts, I discuss how SAGs pursued the "public interest" by seeking injunctions against businesses and even corporate dissolution through public nuisance and quo warranto theories. These efforts to regulate business during the Gilded Age, at a time when standard administrative solutions were absent, directly and indirectly shaped subsequent statutory developments. Polity (2012) 44, 373-399. doi:10.1057/pol.2012.8; published online 11 June 2012
引用
收藏
页码:373 / 399
页数:27
相关论文
共 71 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1892, NY TIMES 0330
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1903, NY TIMES 0330, P2
[3]  
[Anonymous], 1888, NY TIMES 0330, P4
[4]  
[Anonymous], 1888, NY TIMES 0702, P4
[5]  
[Anonymous], HIST AM LAW
[6]  
[Anonymous], 1888, NY TIMES 0330
[7]  
[Anonymous], TRANSFORMATION AM LA
[8]  
[Anonymous], 1892, NY TIMES 0330, P4
[9]  
[Anonymous], 1907, NY TIMES 0330
[10]  
[Anonymous], 1903, NY TIMES 0330