Negative Emotional Outcomes Attenuate Sense of Agency over Voluntary Actions

被引:137
作者
Yoshie, Michiko [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
Haggard, Patrick [1 ]
机构
[1] UCL, Inst Cognit Neurosci, London WC1N 3AR, England
[2] Brighton & Sussex Med Sch, Clin Imaging Sci Ctr, Dept Psychiat, Brighton BN1 9RR, E Sussex, England
[3] Japan Soc Promot Sci, Chiyoda Ku, Tokyo 1028472, Japan
[4] Osaka Univ, Grad Sch Frontier Biosci, Suita, Osaka 5650871, Japan
基金
日本学术振兴会;
关键词
INTENTIONAL BINDING; EXPERIENCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.cub.2013.08.034
中图分类号
Q5 [生物化学]; Q7 [分子生物学];
学科分类号
071010 ; 081704 ;
摘要
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling that one's voluntary actions produce external sensory events [1, 2]. Several psychological theories hypothesized links between SoA and affective evaluation [3-6]. For example, people tend to attribute positive outcomes to their own actions, perhaps reflecting high-level narrative processes that enhance self-esteem [3]. Here we provide the first evidence that such emotional modulations also involve changes in the low-level sensorimotor basis of agency. The intentional binding paradigm [1] was used to quantify the subjective temporal compression between a voluntary action and its sensory consequences, providing an implicit measure of SoA. Emotional valence of action outcomes was manipulated by following participants' key-press actions with negative or positive emotional vocalizations [7], or neutral sounds. We found that intentional binding was reduced for negative compared to positive or neutral outcomes. Discriminant analyses identified a change in time perception of both actions and their negative outcomes, demonstrating that the experience of action itself is subject to affective modulation. A small binding benefit was also found for positive action outcomes. Emotional modulation of SoA may contribute to regulating social behavior. Correctly tracking the valenced effects of one's voluntary actions on other people could underlie successful social interactions.
引用
收藏
页码:2028 / 2032
页数:5
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