Perceptions and alliances in Europe, 1865-1940

In a multipolar system, state leaders will often misperceive the system's distribution of capabilities and/or the relative efficacy of offensive and defensive military doctrines. As a result, they will adopt alliance policies that neither conventional balance-of-power theory nor security dilemma theory can explain. Specifically, when leaders perceive the frontline state in a potential alliance to be more powerful than its immediate rivals, they will tend to avoid a prewar alliance. If leaders believe the frontline potential ally is weaker than immediate rivals but that defense has the military advantage, they will tend to form only a weak prewar alliance. If,however, they perceive the frontline potential ally as relatively weak and believe military offensives are feasible, they will form a tight prewar alliance. European events from 1865 to 1940 support this argument, which may also help illuminate future dangers in post-cold war East Asia.