Semi-Synchronized Non-Blocking Concurrent Kernel Cruising

被引:0
作者
Tian, Donghai [1 ]
Zeng, Qiang [2 ]
Wu, Dinghao [3 ]
Liu, Peng [3 ]
Hu, Changzhen [1 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Inst Technol, Sch Comp Sci & Technol, Beijing Key Lab Software Secur Engn Tech, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[2] Univ South Carolina, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Columbia, SC 29201 USA
[3] Penn State Univ, Coll Informat Sci & Technol, State Coll, PA 16802 USA
关键词
Kernel; virtualization; heap buffer overflow; semi-synchronized; non-blocking; concurrent monitoring;
D O I
10.1109/TCC.2020.2970183
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Kernel heap buffer overflow vulnerabilities have been exposed for decades, but there are few practical countermeasures that can be applied to OS kernels. Previous solutions either suffer from high performance overhead or compatibility problems with mainstream kernels and hardware. In this article, we present Kruiser, a concurrent kernel heap buffer overflow monitor. Unlike conventional methods, the security enforcement of which is usually inlined into the kernel execution, Kruiser migrates security enforcement from the kernel's normal execution to a concurrent monitor process, leveraging the increasingly popular multi-core architectures. To reduce the synchronization overhead between the monitor process and the running kernel, we design a novel semi-synchronized non-blocking monitoring algorithm, which enables efficient runtime detection on live memory without incurring false positives. To prevent the monitor process from being tampered and provide guaranteed performance isolation, we utilize the virtualization technology to run the monitor process out of the monitored VM, while heap memory allocation information is collected inside the monitored VM in a secure and efficient way. The hybrid VM monitoring technique combined with the secure canary that cannot be counterfeited by attackers provides guaranteed overflow detection with high efficiency. We have implemented a prototype of Kruiser based on Linux and the Xen/KVM hypervisor. The evaluation shows that Kruiser can detect realistic kernel heap buffer overflow attacks in cloud environment effectively with minimal cost.
引用
收藏
页码:1428 / 1444
页数:17
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