Research on the tripartite evolutionary game promoting the transformation of traditional buildings to prefabricated buildings

被引:3
作者
He, Wei [1 ]
Fan, Zhengshuo [1 ]
Kong, Dewei [2 ]
机构
[1] Yanshan Univ, Sch Civil Engn & Mech, Qinhuangdao 066000, Peoples R China
[2] Yanshan Univ, Sch Informat Sci & Engn, Qinhuangdao 066000, Peoples R China
关键词
Prefabricated building; Tripartite evolutionary game; MATLAB simulation; Prefabricated building stakeholders; Tripartite decision-making behavior; SUPPLY CHAINS; SUSTAINABILITY; PERSPECTIVE; GOVERNMENT;
D O I
10.1007/s11356-023-30348-4
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
The practices of prefabricated buildings illustrate the incentives in prefabricated markets as well as the decision-making behavior of stakeholders, which can influence the transformation, upgrading, and sustainability of the buildings sector. The game between the stakeholders in the prefabricated buildings market becomes complicated by the fact that they dynamically adjust their strategies in response to changing market conditions. With the aim of quantitatively studying the implications of the dynamic decision behavior of prefabricated construction stakeholders on the prefabricated construction market, this study introduces component suppliers as participating agents and government subsidies and penalties as the main measures. And a three-way model of the evolutionary game involving government subsidies and punitive schemes is constructed by this study. The essay examines the evolutionary equilibrium strategies of each game subject as well as the effect of original strategies and different parameter choices on the decision-making of each subject using MATLAB. The findings reveal that (1) decision-making behaviors among the government, component suppliers, and developers are both interrelated and constrained, but governments are the dominant agents in the evolution of prefabricated buildings. (2) Parameters such as subsidies, penalties, costs, and benefits affect the stability of the tripartite evolutionary model, which remains consistent with the previous research. (3) Component suppliers have an equally important position in the development of prefabricated buildings as recognized entities such as developers and contractors. (4) When subsidies are kept at 40% of the incremental cost and penalties at 80% of the incremental cost, the model combines a fast evolutionary rate with stable model evolution. In conclusion, the article's research findings not only validate the rationality and feasibility of component suppliers as research subjects and confirm the importance of component suppliers but also propose a more reasonable boundary value for penalties and subsidies, which provides a reference for the government to improve the incentive and punishment measures as well as the dynamic adjustment strategy of stakeholders and also provides a new perspective to achieve the goal of sustainable development of construction.
引用
收藏
页码:41529 / 41551
页数:23
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