Judicial Reform or Abusive Constitutionalism in Israel

被引:17
作者
Roznai, Yaniv [1 ,2 ]
Dixon, Rosalind [3 ,4 ]
Landau, David E. [5 ]
机构
[1] Reichman Univ, Harry Radzyner Law Sch, Herzliyya, Israel
[2] Reichman Univ, Rubinstein Ctr Constitut Challenges, Herzliyya, Israel
[3] Univ New South Wales, Law, Fac Law, Sydney, Australia
[4] Univ New South Wales, Gilbert Tobin Ctr Publ Law, Sydney, Australia
[5] Florida State Univ, Coll Law, Int Programs, Tallahassee, FL USA
关键词
Israel; abusive constitutionalism; democratic core; borrowing; constitutional reform; LAW; RULE;
D O I
10.1017/S0021223723000171
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
How should the constitutional reform in Israel be assessed in comparative terms? Comparative constitutional understandings point to the centrality of three key sets of norms as part of the 'democratic minimum core': (i) commitments to free and fair, regular multi-party elections; (ii) political rights and freedoms; and (iii) a system of institutional checks and balances necessary to maintain (i) and (ii). Any change in judicial power and independence must be assessed against the benchmark of the democratic minimum core, and by reference to its cumulative practical effect on a system of institutional checks and balances.We claim that recent changes in Israel may already threaten these institutional checks, and have the potential to do more damage in the future, if given broad effect and if combined with further changes in the power and independence of the Supreme Court. On this basis, we suggest, the relevant changes should be viewed as either 'abusive' or 'proto-abusive' in nature. By threatening to undermine both the power and independence of the Supreme Court of Israel, they directly threaten the health of the constitutional checks and balances system and, hence, the 'democratic minimum core' in Israel.
引用
收藏
页码:292 / 304
页数:13
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