BCMIX: A Blockchain-Based Dynamic Self-Reconfigurable Mixnet

被引:0
作者
Zou, Renpeng [1 ]
Lyu, Xixiang [1 ]
Ma, Jing [1 ]
Zhang, Bowen [1 ]
Wu, Danfang [2 ]
机构
[1] Xidian Univ, Sch Cyber Engn, Xian 710071, Peoples R China
[2] China Acad Space Technol Xian, Xian 710071, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Blockchains; Protocols; Routing; Resists; Privacy; Additives; Robustness; Anonymous communication; blockchain; security; self-reconfigurable; mix network attacks; ANONYMITY;
D O I
10.1109/TNET.2023.3244962
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The increasing awareness of privacy preservation has led to a strong focus on mix networks (mixnets) protecting anonymity. As an efficient mixnet, cMix greatly reduces the latency, but brings privacy leakage risks due to the use of presetting mix nodes controlled by service providers. Besides, cMix is susceptible to blocking attacks that paralyze the anonymous service. In this paper, we combine blockchain with cMix, and come up with a BlockChain-based dynamic self-reconfigurable MIXnet (BCMIX) approach for anonymous communication. In BCMIX, we design PoW voting, IP sharding and VRF voting algorithms to select mix nodes from blockchain miners. With these voting algorithms, BCMIX can mitigate blocking attacks and blockchain Sybil attacks. Then we present an additive homomorphic mixnet protocol altered from cMix. Furthermore, we design a transaction-based key-exchange protocol for users and mix nodes to negotiate keys with each other, which resists Man-in-the-Middle attacks that exist in cMix. We also demonstrate the security and anonymity of BCMIX under formal security models. To evaluate BCMIX, we leverage the distribution of mining pools in the real-world to test the system's performance and ability to resist the mentioned attacks. The results show that with the proper mining difficulty, the probability of an attacker launching collusion attacks and Sybil attacks is negligible. Compared with the existing anonymous systems, BCMIX provides better resilience to known attacks while enabling low-latency anonymous communication without requiring significant bandwidth or storage resources.
引用
收藏
页码:2222 / 2235
页数:14
相关论文
共 32 条
  • [1] Andersen DG, 2003, USENIX ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH USENIX SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES AND SYSTEMS (USITS'03), P31
  • [2] Berthold O., 2001, Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies. International Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability. Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol.2009), P30
  • [3] Chaum David, 2017, Applied Cryptography and Network Security. 15th International Conference, ACNS 2017. Proceedings: LNCS 10355, P557, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-61204-1_28
  • [4] UNTRACEABLE ELECTRONIC MAIL, RETURN ADDRESSES, AND DIGITAL PSEUDONYMS
    CHAUM, DL
    [J]. COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, 1981, 24 (02) : 84 - 88
  • [5] Dissent: Accountable Anonymous Group Messaging
    Corrigan-Gibbs, Henry
    Ford, Bryan
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (CCS'10), 2010, : 340 - 350
  • [6] Danezis G, 2005, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V3424, P35
  • [7] Danezis G, 2007, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V4776, P30
  • [8] AnonPubSub: Anonymous publish-subscribe overlays
    Daubert, Joerg
    Fischer, Mathias
    Grube, Tim
    Schiffner, Stefan
    Kikiras, Panayotis
    Muehlhaeuser, Max
    [J]. COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, 2016, 76 : 42 - 53
  • [9] Dingledine R, 2004, USENIX ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM, P303
  • [10] Freedman M. J., 2002, P 9 ACM C COMP COMM, P206, DOI DOI 10.1145/586110.586137