The old evidence problem and the inference to the best explanation

The Problem of Old Evidence (POE) states that Bayesian confirmation theory cannot explain why a theory H can be confirmed by a piece of evidence E already known. Different dimensions of POE have been highlighted. Here, I consider the dynamic and static dimension. In the former, we want to explain how the discovery that H accounts for E confirms H. In the latter, we want to understand why E is and will be a reason to prefer H over its competitors. The aim of the paper is twofold. Firstly, I stress that two recent solutions to the dynamic dimension, recently proposed by Eva and Hartmann, can be read in terms of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). On this base, I gauge the weaknesses and strengths of the two models. Namely, I show that the two authors endorse a particular IBE's formulation, and that it is still unsure if it is the one descriptively used. Moreover, I contend that, while one condition of their first model is not expression of this formulation, the only condition of their second model is. Secondly, I focus on the static dimension of POE which, now, has to be expressed in IBE terms. To solve it, I rely on the counterfactual approach, and on a version of IBE in which explanatory considerations help to evaluate the terms in Bayes' theorem. However, it turns out that the problems of the counterfactual approach recur even when it is used to solve the static POE in IBE terms.