A Two-Stage Demand Response Stackelberg Game of Data Center Operators and the System Operator Based on Kriging Metamodel

Due to the spatially and temporally transferable workloads, data centers (DCs) become increasingly important in demand response (DR) implementations. By making full use of their owned DCs, data center operators (DCOs) are significant DR resource providers. To fully exploit the DR capability of the DCO on different time scales, we present a two-stage scheduling model for DCOs and the system operator (SO). In the DR scheduling, the SO formulates DR compensation prices first, and then each DCO decides its best-response power demands accordingly. Considering the profit-hunting property of the SO and DCOs, a two-stage DR Stackelberg game model is proposed. Furthermore, the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium are proved. Finally, to protect the data privacy of DCOs, we design a Kriging-metamodel-based algorithm which avoids the DCO privacy exposure to the SO in the optimization process. Simulation results prove the accuracy and the calculation efficiency of the proposed Kriging-metamodel-based algorithm.