Robustness Against Indirect Invasions in Asymmetric Games with Continuous Strategy Spaces

被引：0

作者：

Narang, Aradhana ^{[1
]}

Shaiju, A. J. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] JIIT, Dept Math, Sect 62, Noida 201309, India

[2] IIT Madras, Dept Math, Chennai 600036, India

来源：

INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW | 2023年 / 25卷 / 04期

关键词：

Asymmetric evolutionary games; games with continuous strategy spaces; robustness against indirect invasions; evolutionarily stable sets; strict equilibrium set; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES; STABILITY; SELECTION; STATES;

D O I：

10.1142/S0219198923500123

中图分类号：

O1 [数学];

学科分类号：

0701 ; 070101 ;

摘要：

Strategies which are robust against indirect invasions (RAII) have been studied in the literature for symmetric games. In this paper, we introduce the notion of RAII profiles for asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces. For these games, we prove that the set of all indirect neutral mutants of a RAII profile is equivalent to a minimal evolutionarily stable set. Furthermore, globally strong uninvadable profiles are shown to be RAII profiles. We also discuss connections between evolutionarily stable sets and strict equilibrium sets of profiles.

引用

页数：16

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