Can military executives improve corporate performance? Evidence from industrial competitive pressure*

被引:9
作者
Hao, Ying [1 ]
Li, Junyi [1 ]
Ni, Juan [2 ,4 ]
Yin, Ziqi [3 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Normal Univ, Business Sch, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Finance & Taxat, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[3] UCL, London, England
[4] 182 Nanhu Ave, East Lake Hightech Dev Zone, Wuhan 430073, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Military executives; Corporate performance; Industrial competitive pressure; Product recall; Workplace safety; PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION; FINANCIAL LEVERAGE; FIRM; OVERCONFIDENCE; EXPERIENCES; IMPACT; DEBT;
D O I
10.1016/j.pacfin.2023.102052
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine whether top executives with military experience improve corporate performance compared with nonmilitary executives. We find that firms with military executives have better sales growth, cost efficiency and operating performance than do firms with nonmilitary executives but mainly in highly competitive industries. The results are robust to adopting the PSM method and confronting changes in the competitive condition. Furthermore, we find that military executives influence corporate performance through the pressure resistance and organizational culture channels. In addition, executives with military experience are associated with fewer product recall and workplace safety cases and implement better quality and safety management than do nonmilitary executives. The relation is also strongest for highly competitive industries-even with financial constraints-indicating that military executives do not profit at the expense of product quality and workplace safety. Our findings suggest that military experience as a determinant of managerial traits constantly impacts decision-making and corporate performance.
引用
收藏
页数:19
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