Self-serving bias in redistribution choices: Accounting for beliefs and norms

被引:6
作者
Amasino, Dianna R. [1 ,4 ]
Pace, Davide Domenico [1 ,2 ,3 ]
van der Weele, Joel [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Amsterdam, Amsterdam Sch Econ, CREED, Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] Ludwig Maximilians Univ Munchen, CIPSM, Munich, Germany
[3] Tinbergen Inst, Amsterdam, Netherlands
[4] Univ Amsterdam, Amsterdam Sch Econ, Ctr Expt Econ & Polit Decis Making CREED, Roetersstr 11, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands
关键词
Redistribution; Self-serving bias; Fairness; Norms; Online experiments; SOCIAL NORMS; FAIRNESS IDEALS; ALLOCATION; ATTRIBUTION; COOPERATION; FACT; LUCK;
D O I
10.1016/j.joep.2023.102654
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We explore the psychological mechanisms underlying self-serving redistribution decisions in an experimental setting. This self-serving bias in redistribution has been attributed not only to self-interest, but also to constructs such as differing beliefs about the hard work or luck underlying inequality, differing fairness views, and differing perceptions of social norms. In this study, we directly measure each of these potential mechanisms and compare their mediating roles in the relationship between status and redistribution. In our experiment, participants complete real-effort tasks and then are randomly assigned a high or low pay rate per correct answer to exogenously induce (dis)advantaged status. Participants are then paired and those assigned the role of dictator decide how to divide their joint earnings. We find that advantaged dictators keep more for themselves than disadvantaged dictators and report different fairness views and beliefs about task performance, but not different perceptions of social norms. Further, only fairness views play a significant mediating role between status and allocation differences, suggesting this is the primary mechanism underlying self-serving differences in support for redistribution.
引用
收藏
页数:16
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