Nothing Wasted: Full Contribution Enforcement in Federated Edge Learning

被引:13
作者
Hu, Qin [1 ]
Wang, Shengling [2 ]
Xiong, Zehui [3 ]
Cheng, Xiuzhen [4 ]
机构
[1] Indiana Univ Purdue Univ, Dept Comp & Informat Sci, Indianapolis, IN 46202 USA
[2] Beijing Normal Univ, Sch Artificial Intelligence, Beijing 100875, Peoples R China
[3] Singapore Univ Technol & Design, Pillar Informat Syst Technol & Design, Singapore 487372, Singapore
[4] Shandong Univ, Sch Comp Sci & Technol, Jinan 250355, Shandong, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金; 国家重点研发计划;
关键词
Servers; Games; Training; Optimization; Computational modeling; Performance evaluation; Analytical models; Edge computing; federated learning; game theory; INCENTIVE MECHANISM; OPTIMIZATION; FRAMEWORK; NETWORKS;
D O I
10.1109/TMC.2021.3123195
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The explosive amount of data generated at the network edge makes mobile edge computing an essential technology to support real-time applications, calling for powerful data processing and analysis provided by machine learning (ML) techniques. In particular, federated edge learning (FEL) becomes prominent in securing the privacy of data owners by keeping the data locally used to train ML models. Existing studies on FEL either utilize in-process optimization or remove unqualified participants in advance. In this paper, we enhance the collaboration from all edge devices in FEL to guarantee that the ML model is trained using all available local data to accelerate the learning process. To that aim, we propose a collective extortion (CE) strategy under the imperfect-information multi-player FEL game, which is proved to be effective in helping the server efficiently elicit the full contribution of all devices without worrying about suffering from any economic loss. Technically, our proposed CE strategy extends the classical extortion strategy in controlling the proportionate share of expected utilities for a single opponent to the swiftly homogeneous control over a group of players, which further presents an attractive trait of being impartial for all participants. Moreover, the CE strategy enriches the game theory hierarchy, facilitating a wider application scope of the extortion strategy. Both theoretical analysis and experimental evaluations validate the effectiveness and fairness of our proposed scheme.
引用
收藏
页码:2850 / 2861
页数:12
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