EVOLUTIONARY GAME ANALYSIS OF MULTI-ACTOR PEDESTRIAN CROSSING UNDER PEAK HOUR CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES

Pedestrian traffic violations at intersections are a major cause of pedestrian accidents, especially red-light running, and they are repeatedly prohibited in China. This paper uses evolutionary game theory to investigate the complex interaction mechanism between the behavior of government, pedestrians, and drivers at intersections when pedestrians are preparing to cross a crosswalk at a red light. Firstly, the impact of the illegal pedestrian crossing on motor vehicle traffic flow during rush hour is considered, and the impact of government giving certain incentives to drivers and pedestrians who obey the rules on their behavioral decisions is studied; secondly, ideal events are defined and the impact of key factors on the dynamic evolutionary process is analyzed; finally, real data in the form of laws and regulations, literature, and questionnaires are used to conduct Matlab simulation. This paper finds that drivers' behavioral decisions evolve to gradually stabilize in obeying traffic rules, while government and pedestrians' behavioral decisions are in cyclical fluctuations. The main factors affecting desirable events in terms of priority are: firstly, pedestrian waiting time, collision probability between violating pedestrians and non-violating drivers, damage to pedestrians in traffic accidents; then fines for violating pedestrians; and finally, other factors. The results of the study can provide recommendations for the government to improve the transportation environment.