Heterogeneous Blockholders and Enterprise Innovation: Evidence From the Mixed-Ownership Reform in China

被引:0
作者
Xia, Hui [1 ]
Ling, Shixian [1 ,3 ]
Liu, Zhangxin [2 ]
机构
[1] Shandong Univ, Weihai, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Western Australia, Business Sch, Perth, WA, Australia
[3] Shandong Univ, Business Sch, 180 Wenhua Xilu, Weihai 264209, Shandong, Peoples R China
关键词
mixed ownership reform; equity structure; heterogeneous blockholders; enterprise innovation; Corporate governance; MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; PERFORMANCE; EFFICIENCY;
D O I
10.1177/21582440231207461
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
The mixed ownership reform of China is a kind of further partial privatization for the listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and an opportunity for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) to expand their commerce boundaries. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of heterogeneous blockholders on corporate innovation. Spanning the analysis with listed companies in China from 2007 to 2017, we find that heterogeneous blockholders have a significant positive effect on enterprise innovation. Lowering agency costs and improving corporate innovation efficiency are the two plausible mechanisms. From further research, we find that compared with non-SOEs, the positive effect of heterogeneous blockholders on enterprise innovation is more pronounced for SOEs, and the effect is more positive with the improvement of relative power balance between heterogeneous blockholders. The paper sheds light on the innovation effects of mixed-ownership reform in emerging and transitioning countries.JEL Classification: G32, M13, D23, G34
引用
收藏
页数:14
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