On the number of equilibria of the replicator-mutator dynamics for noisy social dilemmas

被引:2
作者
Chen, Luoer [1 ]
Deng, Churou [1 ]
Duong, Manh Hong [2 ]
Han, The Anh [3 ]
机构
[1] Jinan Birmingham Joint Inst, Jinan, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Birmingham, Sch Math, Birmingham, England
[3] Teesside Univ, Sch Comp, Engn & Digital Technol, Middlesbrough, England
关键词
Evolutionary game theory; Uncertainty; Random games; Social dilemmas; Cooperation; Mutation; EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; COOPERATION; CYCLES; GAMES;
D O I
10.1016/j.chaos.2024.114565
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
In this paper, we consider the replicator-mutator dynamics for pairwise social dilemmas where the payoff entries are random variables. The randomness is incorporated to take into account the uncertainty, which is inevitable in practical applications and may arise from different sources such as lack of data for measuring the outcomes, noisy and rapidly changing environments, as well as unavoidable human estimate errors. We analytically and numerically compute the probability that the replicator-mutator dynamics has a given number of equilibria for four classes of pairwise social dilemmas (Prisoner's Dilemma, Snow-Drift Game, Stag -Hunt Game and Harmony Game). As a result, we characterise the qualitative behaviour of such probabilities as a function of the mutation rate. Our results clearly show the influence of the mutation rate and the uncertainty in the payoff matrix definition on the number of equilibria in these games. Overall, our analysis has provided novel theoretical contributions to the understanding of the impact of uncertainty on the behavioural diversity in a complex dynamical system.
引用
收藏
页数:11
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