Noise-induced sustainability of cooperation in Prisoner?s Dilemma game

被引:8
作者
Feng, Tian-Jiao [1 ,2 ]
Fan, Song-Jia [1 ]
Li, Cong [3 ]
Tao, Yi [1 ,3 ,4 ]
Zheng, Xiu-Deng [1 ]
机构
[1] Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Zool, Key Lab Animal Ecol & Conservat Biol, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China
[3] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Ecol & Environm, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[4] Yunnan Univ, Inst Biomed Res, Kunming 650091, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Stochastic Prisoner?s Dilemma game; Stochastic TFT-AllD game; Non -equilibrium phase transition; Fixation probability; Quasi -stationary distribution; EVOLUTION;
D O I
10.1016/j.amc.2022.127603
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
Based on the concept of stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma (SPD) game in experimental eco-nomics proposed by Bereby-Meyer and Roth (Am Econ Rev 96 (2006) 1029-1042) (see also H. Kunreuther et al., Judgm. Decis. Mak. 4 (5) (2009) 363-384), the dynamical prop-erties of the SPD game is investigated in this paper. For the non-repeated SPD game, we can see that the increase of noise intensity will not only lead to loss of the stochastic stability of the boundary state corresponding to defection but also the non-equilibrium phase transition of the quasi-stationary distribution of the system, and that the fixation probability of cooperation will increase with the increase of noise intensity. However, for the stochastic TFT-AllD game, the increase of noise intensity will lead to the loss of the stochastic stability of the two boundaries corresponding to cooperation and defection re-spectively, but will not lead to the non-equilibrium phase transition of the quasi-stationary distribution of the system. Moreover, as a special case of the stochastic TFT-AllD game (i.e., (m - 1)(b - c) = 2 c), we show that the fixation probability of TFT will increase (decrease) with the increase of noise intensity if the initial frequency of TFT is less (or larger) than 1/2.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:10
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