The impact of a competitor's Chapter 11 bankruptcy on firm risk-taking

被引:0
作者
Choi, Yohan [1 ]
Barden, Jeffrey [2 ]
Arthurs, Jonathan [2 ]
Cho, Sam Yul [2 ]
机构
[1] Southern Illinois Univ, Sch Business, Management & Mkt Dept, Il State Rte 157, Edwardsville, IL 62026 USA
[2] Oregon State Univ, Coll Business, Dept Strategy & Entrepreneurship, Corvallis, OR USA
关键词
Bankruptcy; risk behavior; strategic risk-taking; uncertainty; CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION; DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES; PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK; FINANCIAL DISTRESS; UNCERTAINTY; STRATEGY; MANAGEMENT; CONTAGION; OPTIONS; ANNOUNCEMENTS;
D O I
10.1177/03128962231205461
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Using a difference-in-differences method, this study examines the effect of a competitor's Chapter 11 bankruptcy on a firm's risk-taking. The contingent nature of a competitor's Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which protects the competitor from creditors' demands during financial reorganization, may increase uncertainty in the industry. Consequently, the study tests the hypothesis that other firms in the industry respond to a competitor's bankruptcy by decreasing risky investments in research and development (R&D), capital expenditures and acquisitions. To validate and extend this hypothesis, the study also hypothesizes that a firm's strong financial standing-low leverage and good performance-and the firm's diversification reduce the negative effect of the competitor's bankruptcy on firm risk-taking. Findings from a study of US public firms suggest that, after controlling for industry conditions, firms indeed reduce their risk-taking when a competitor declares bankruptcy and that lower firm leverage, stronger firm performance, and greater firm diversification mitigate this effect. Together, these findings shed light on the literatures on bankruptcy and firm risk-taking.JEL Classification: L22, M10, D81, D25
引用
收藏
页码:363 / 389
页数:27
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