Government Choices of Debt Instruments

被引:7
作者
Mosley, Layna [1 ]
Rosendorff, B. Peter [2 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[2] NYU, New York, NY USA
关键词
SOVEREIGN DEBT; INTERNATIONAL FINANCE; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; BOND FINANCE; REGIME TYPE; BANK LOANS; TRANSPARENCY; INFORMATION; CORRUPTION; PARTIES;
D O I
10.1093/isq/sqad030
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Governments borrow from a range of creditors-commercial banks, sovereign bondholders, official bilateral creditors, and multilateral financial institutions. Sovereigns' creditor portfolios vary significantly across space and time. While creditor portfolios partly reflect supply-side considerations (macroeconomic profiles and associated default risk), they also reflect governments' preferences over fiscal transparency. Governments that prefer to disclose less information about economic outcomes will choose borrowing instruments that are less public, such as private loans from banks (versus bondholders) and official sector borrowing from bilateral (versus multilateral) creditors. Empirical analyses of government debt composition across developing nations confirm these predictions. We also find support for our claims at the subnational level, using data from Mexican municipalities. We treat various types of credit (bilateral lending, multilateral finance, and sovereign bonds) as related, rather than distinct.
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页数:13
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