ADEQUATE IDEA AND ORDER OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE TREATY OF THE REFORM OF THE UNDERSTANDING OF SPINOZA: PROLEGOMENA TO THE ONTOLOGY OF ETHICS

The article aims to present some key elements of the Spinozian doctrine of the adequate idea and the order of philosophizing as it appears in the early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. It will try to show that the second part of Spinoza's method consists in explaining the "means" available to ensure truth (genetic definition), and in concatenating and ordering ideas in such a way that the mind can reproduce (totally or partially) the formality of Nature. Through this, we will affirm that this second part of the method, although inconclusive and problematic, has the virtue of presenting two very important questions for the understanding of the future ontology of the Ethics: on the one hand, the doctrine of genetic definition, the center of the Spinozian geometrical more; and on the other, the reflection on the "order" in which singular things exist and the nature of their deduction.