Pricing and greening strategies in a dual-channel supply chain with cost and profit sharing contracts

被引:30
作者
Das, Rubi [1 ]
Barman, Abhijit [1 ]
Roy, Balaji [2 ]
De, Pijus Kanti [1 ]
机构
[1] Natl Inst Technol Silchar, Dept Math, Silchar 788010, Assam, India
[2] Presidency Univ, Dept Math, 86-1 Coll St, Kolkata 700073, W Bengal, India
关键词
Supply chain; Dual-channel; Greening decision; Sales price; Coordination contract; RISK-AVERSE; POLICIES; COORDINATION; MANUFACTURER; MANAGEMENT; COMPETITION; DECISIONS; DEMAND; MODEL;
D O I
10.1007/s10668-022-02255-0
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
The expanding customer consciousness of ecological sustainability has motivated supply chain members to participate in green activities. In this paper, the coordination issue of a dual-channel supply chain is studied under consideration of the greening level of the items. The two-stage supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer is responsible for keeping the item's greening level and sells the products through two channels (a) a direct online channel and (b) a traditional retail channel. Market demand depends on the selling price and greening level of the item. Furthermore, the pricing and greening strategies of the channel members are discussed under the centralized and decentralized scenarios. Compared to the centralized scenario, optimum pricing at the retail channel is higher in the decentralized scenario while the greening level of products is low. The outcomes exhibit that the profit of the supply chain in a decentralized scenario decreases compared to the centralized scenario. To enhance the supply chain profit, we have developed two coordinate mechanisms of the decentralized scenario with a cost-sharing contract and a profit-sharing contract. Our analysis shows that the profit-sharing contract can realize the coordination, but the cost-sharing contract cannot. A numerical example has been demonstrated to quantify the effectiveness of different contracts, and the model's finding is demonstrated.
引用
收藏
页码:5053 / 5086
页数:34
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