When structural reforms of labor markets harm productivity. Evidence from the German IAB panel

被引：3

作者：

Hoxha, Sergei ^{[1
,3
,4
,5
,6
]}

Kleinknecht, Alfred ^{[2
,7
,8
,9
]}

机构：

[1] Gouwestr 17, NL-3522 CH Utrecht, Netherlands

[2] Pk Klinkenberg 53, NL-2361 WZ Warmond, Netherlands

[3] Hans Bockler Stiftung, Dusseldorf, Germany

[4] Erasmus Univ, Rotterdam, Netherlands

[5] Univ Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium

[6] European Cent Bank, Eurotower, Kaiserstr 17, D-60311 Frankfurt, Germany

[7] Delft Univ Technol, Delft, Netherlands

[8] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands

[9] Kwansei Gakuin Univ, Sch Econ, Nishinomiya, Japan

来源：

INDUSTRIAL AND CORPORATE CHANGE | 2023年

关键词：

EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION; FIRM-LEVEL; TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT; INNOVATION EVIDENCE; FLEXIBLE LABOR; FLEXIBILITY; IMPACT; WAGES; UNEMPLOYMENT; RIGIDITIES;

D O I：

10.1093/icc/dtad060

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We find firm-level evidence that removing labor market rigidities can harm productivity growth. This holds, in particular, in industries with a high 'cumulativeness' of knowledge, i.e., when accumulation of worker-embodied (and often 'tacit') knowledge from experience is important for innovative competencies. We conclude that there is a trade-off between the efficient allocation of scarce resources in a static neoclassical perspective and dynamic Schumpeterian efficiency, the latter requiring rigidities in labor markets that are valuable for innovation.

引用

页码：541 / 554

页数：14

共 48 条

[41]

SHAPIRO C, 1984, AM ECON REV, V74, P433

[42] JOB SECURITY IN AN EFFICIENCY WAGE MODEL [J].