Security Analysis of Distributed Consensus Filtering Under Replay Attacks

This work studies the security of consensus-based distributed filtering under the replay attack, which can freely select a part of sensors and modify their measurements into previously recorded ones. We analyze the performance degradation of distributed estimation caused by the replay attack, and utilize the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence to quantify the attack stealthiness. Specifically, for a stable system, we prove that under any replay attack, the estimation error is not only bounded, but also can re-enter the steady state. In that case, we prove that the replay attack is ? -stealthy, where ? can be calculated based on two Lyapunov equations. On the other hand, for an unstable system, we prove that the trace of estimation error covariance is lower bounded by an exponential function, which indicates that the estimation error may diverge due to the attack. In view of this, we provide a sufficient condition to ensure that any replay attack is detectable. Furthermore, we analyze the case that the adversary starts to attack only if the current measurement is close to a previously recorded one. Finally, we verify the theoretical results via several numerical simulations.