A novel hybrid cybersecurity scheme against false data injection attacks in automated power systems

被引:8
作者
Hussain, Shahbaz [1 ,2 ]
Hussain, S. M. Suhail [3 ,4 ]
Hemmati, Marziyeh [2 ]
Iqbal, Atif [1 ]
Alammari, Rashid [1 ]
Zanero, Stefano [2 ]
Ragaini, Enrico [2 ]
Gruosso, Giambattista [2 ]
机构
[1] Qatar Univ, Dept Elect Engn, Doha, Qatar
[2] Politecn Milan, Dipartimento Elettron Informaz & Bioingn, Milan, Italy
[3] King Fahd Univ Petr & Minerals KFUPM, Dept Elect Engn, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
[4] King Fahd Univ Petr & Minerals KFUPM, Interdisciplinary Res Ctr Renewable Energy & Power, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
关键词
Cyberattacks; False data injection; Real time digital simulation; IEC; 61850; Communication protocols; Control authority; Countermeasures; MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION; PROTECTION; GOOSE;
D O I
10.1186/s41601-023-00312-y
中图分类号
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要
The conventional power systems are evolving as smart grids. In recent times cyberattacks on smart grids have been increasing. Among different attacks, False Data Injection (FDI) is considered as an emerging threat that has significant impact. By exploiting the vulnerabilities of IEC 61850 Generic Object-Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) and Sampled Values (SV) attackers can launch different FDI attacks. In this paper, a real-time set up capable of simulating FDI on GOOSE and SV protocols is developed to evaluate the impact of such attacks on power grid. IEC 62351 stipulates cybersecurity guidelines for GOOSE and SV, but only at communication or Information Technology (IT) level. Hence there is a need to develop a holistic security both at IT and Operation Technology (OT) level. In this regard, a novel sequence content resolver-based hybrid security scheme suitable to tackle FDI attacks on GOOSE and SV is proposed. Furthermore, the computational performance of the proposed hybrid security scheme is presented to demonstrate its applicability to the time critical GOOSE and SV protocols.
引用
收藏
页数:15
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