Weakness not crisis: Brexit and the UK constitution

The UK's referendum vote to leave the EU in June 2016 generated deep divisions in British politics. It led to the resignation of incumbent Prime Minister David Cameron the following day, and an inability to deliver Brexit led to the resignation of his successor Theresa May in 2019. In addition, it has led to a number of legal challenges to the policies and processes of implementing these by both May's and Boris Johnson's governments. Those who support leaving the EU have characterised this period as one of 'crisis', in which politicians-unable to agree on a means of leaving-were pitted against the electorate or public will. Judicial challenges to the terms of exit and means of achieving Brexit were further incorporated into notions of crisis to the extent that failure to implement Brexit was portrayed as a crisis affecting the entire political system, or a constitutional crisis. In this article, we unpack this discourse, and by distinguishing between different forms of crises challenge the existing understanding of Brexit as a constitutional crisis. Rather, we suggest that these problems stemmed from constitutional weaknesses, specifically that the constitution is based on a reductionist understanding of power.