Happiness and Political Power in Theory and Practice

The aim of this paper is to evaluate Kant's position on the relationship between political authority and happiness, focusing on the statement he makes in Theory and Practice about the possibility that the supreme legal power would direct its laws to happiness. This seems to contradict one of the core principles of his doctrine of right, namely, that political power has as its limit legal legislation on private conceptions of wellbeing and happiness. Therefore, in order to resolve the apparent contradiction, first, I will introduce this issue to the light of the Kantian distinction between right and ethics. Then, I will argue that Kant adopts a political anti-eudaimonistic position, and I will propose that the laws he talks about here are not aimed at "happiness", which it is a private and subjective principle, but to salus publica, which is understood as the conservation of the constitution of the State. Finally, I will consider that this "public well-being" must be ensured by right not only with respect to what happens within the State, but also beyond its borders.