The evolutionary game of national park tourism development and governance: public supervision, government regulation and tourism enterprise

The public is increasingly a critical stakeholder of national parks. It has become a governance strategy in many countries to incorporate public participation into the supervision system of national parks. This paper uses evolutionary game theory to study the feasibility of public supervision and analyzes the impacts of penalty and reward mechanisms on the dynamic evolutionary game process and result. Evolutionary results show that: (1) public supervision can help ease the pressure of government regulation, but it can't solve the problem of cyclical fluctuations in the overdevelopment of national park tourism. (2) Under the dual supervision of the public and the government, the government evaluates the probability of overdevelopment of enterprises and dynamically adjusts the penalty amount, which can solve the cyclical fluctuations of national park tourism development. (3) The more rewards given by the local government to the tourism enterprise for developing national parks in the mode of sustainable tourism are not always better. The relationship between the reward amount and the probability of sustainable development of enterprises is non-monotonic.