Does IRS Monitoring Matter for the Cost of Bank Loans?

被引:0
作者
Bermpei, Theodora [1 ]
Kalyvas, Antonios Nikolaos [2 ,3 ]
Wolfe, Simon [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Essex, Essex Business Sch, Colchester CO4 3SQ, England
[2] Univ Kent, Kent Business Sch, Dept Accounting & Finance, Sibson Bldg Parkwood Rd, Canterbury CT2 7FS, Kent, England
[3] Univ Southampton, Ctr Empir Res Finance & Banking, Southampton Business Sch, Dept Banking & Finance, Southampton SO171BJ, England
关键词
Syndicated loans; IRS monitoring; Information asymmetry; Lending relationships; CORPORATE-TAX AVOIDANCE; LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; INFORMATION RENTS; DEBT; ENFORCEMENT; GOVERNANCE; BENEFITS; IMPACT; PRICE; POWER;
D O I
10.1007/s10693-023-00403-9
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We show that IRS monitoring exerts a significantly negative effect on the cost of syndicated loans. A one standard deviation increase in the probability of an IRS audit decreases loan spreads by around nine basis points. We also find that this effect is stronger for borrowers with better lending relationships and credible access to public markets. These results indicate that IRS monitoring could increase the bargaining power of borrowers and restrain banks from extracting informational rents from their lending relationships. Thus, they provide a novel insight into how IRS monitoring could lower the cost of financing from the banking system.
引用
收藏
页码:153 / 188
页数:36
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