Coordination games and regional economic transitions

被引:0
作者
O'Neill, Moira [1 ]
机构
[1] Kent State Univ, Dept Geog, Kent, OH 44240 USA
关键词
coordination failure; rightsizing; agent-based modelling; game theory; spatial inequality; INCREASING RETURNS; PERSISTENT POVERTY; POLICY; MODEL; INSTITUTIONS; FAILURES; EASTERN; GROWTH; TRAPS;
D O I
10.1080/21622671.2023.2175030
中图分类号
P9 [自然地理学]; K9 [地理];
学科分类号
0705 ; 070501 ;
摘要
This study proposes a systematic approach to detecting and analysing coordination and/or coordination failure in regional environments. Specifically, it proposes leveraging the logic of the coordination game known as the Stag Hunt to infer whether levels of cynicism, distrust, poor communication and a lack of leadership are anchoring a region in poverty and inhibiting the transition to a more solvent and competitive economy. An application to the Mahoning Valley region in the United States highlights the many benefits of this approach as well as opportunities for future research.
引用
收藏
页码:221 / 239
页数:19
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