Amid widespread anti-government protests, on July 25, 2021, the Tunisian President, Kais Saied, dismissed the Prime Minister and suspended parliamentary activities. Thereafter, political parties' leaders and key civil actors assumed shifting and, lately, conflating positions in reaction to Saied's move. Although they often called for the formation of a united front against Saied's unilateral takeover of state institutions, their actions remained largely uncoordinated in avoiding the risks of authoritarian backsliding. Drawing on a political party perspective, this article seeks to understand why the Tunisian political forces failed to coordinate their actions against Saied's presidential coup. The article contends that in post-July 2021, the Tunisian opposition failed to unite effectively because political forces were primarily driven by opportunism and their past ideological stance towards Ennahda. As a result, political parties opposing Saied's move preferred to unite selectively. The article invites us to rethink the historical legacy of Tunisian pact-making and alliance politics by concluding that Saied's actions set distinct rules from the dynamics of opposition coordination that distinguished the Collectif du 18 Octobre (2005) and the post-Uprisings period. Yet, these rules re-echo some old pact-making patterns that characterised the Tunisian opposition under Ben Ali's One Party state.
