Modeling and analyzing self-resistance of connected automated vehicular platoons under different cyberattack injection modes

被引:2
作者
Luo, Dongyu [1 ]
Wang, Jiangfeng [1 ]
Wang, Yu [1 ]
Dong, Jiakuan [1 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Key Lab Transport Ind Big Data Applicat Technol Co, 3 Shangyuan Cun, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China
关键词
Connected automated vehicular platoon; Car -following model; Cyberattacks; Self -resistance capability; ADAPTIVE CRUISE CONTROL; CAR-FOLLOWING MODELS; CONTROL-SYSTEM; VEHICLE; STABILITY; SECURITY; ATTACKS; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.aap.2024.107494
中图分类号
TB18 [人体工程学];
学科分类号
1201 ;
摘要
The high-level integration and interaction between the information flow at the cyber layer and the physical subjects at the vehicular layer enables the connected automated vehicles (CAVs) to achieve rapid, cooperative and shared travel. However, the cyber layer is challenged by malicious attacks and the shortage of communication resources, which makes the vehicular layer suffer from system nonlinearity, disturbance randomness and behavior uncertainty, thus interfering with the stable operation of the platoon. So far, scholars usually adopt the method of assuming or improving the car -following model to explore the platoon behavior and the defense mechanism in cyberattacks, but they have not considered whether the model itself has disturbance and impact on cyberattack defenses. In other words, it is still being determined whether the car -following model designed can be fully applicable to such cyberattacks. To provide a theoretical basis for vehicular layer modeling, it is necessary to comprehend the self -resistance of different car -following models faced on various cyberattacks. First, we review the car -following models adopted on the vehicular layer in cyberattacks, involving traffic engineering, physical statistics, and platoon dynamics. Based on the review, we divide the malicious attacks faced by the cyber layer into explicit attacks and implicit attacks. Second, we develop a cooperative generalized force model (CGFM), which combines and unifies the r -predecessors following communication topology. The proposed models, labeled the vulnerable cooperative intelligent driver model (VCIDM), the vulnerable cooperative optimal velocity model (VCOVM), and the vulnerable cooperative platoon dynamics model (VCPDM), incorporate the CGFM model and assorted cyberattack injection modes to explain the cyberattack effects on the platoon selfresistance capability. Upon the described models, we provide six indicators in three dimensions from the basic traffic element, including drivers, vehicles, and environment. These indicators illustrate driver tolerance, vehicle adaptability, and environmental resistance when a platoon faces attacks such as bogus information, replay/ delay, and communication interruption. We arrange and reorganize the car -following models and the cyberattack injection modes to complete the research on the self -resistance capability of the platoon, which has positive research value and practical significance for enhancing the endogenous security at the vehicular layer and improving the intrusion tolerability at the cyber layer.
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页数:21
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