Populism, Party Ideology, and Economic Expropriations

被引:2
作者
Jud, Stefano [1 ]
Reiter, Dan [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
[2] Emory Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
关键词
Expropriation; populism; foreign direct investment; FOREIGN DIRECT-INVESTMENT; DOMESTIC POLITICS; TRADE-POLICY; OIL; NATIONALIZATION; GLOBALIZATION; INSTITUTIONS; CORPORATIONS; GOVERNMENTS; CONSTRAINTS;
D O I
10.1080/03050629.2023.2264464
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
What is the connection between populism, globalization, and international political economy (IPE) more broadly? Many presume that all populists oppose all forms of globalization, focusing on trade, migration, and international institutions. This article examines the underexplored but important relationship between populism and foreign direct investment, specifically whether populists are more likely than other leaders to expropriate foreign-owned economic assets. The article develops a theory proposing that left populists but not right populists are more likely to expropriate foreign-owned assets, to maintain their domestic political support. The article presents new quantitative panel data on expropriations in all states from 1990 to 2018, finding that left populists but not right populists are significantly more likely than other leaders to expropriate. Further, neither bilateral investment treaties or domestic political institutions, such as democratic constraints, prevent left populists from expropriating. Complementing the quantitative analysis, the article demonstrates these points with an illustrative case study of Bolivia under Evo Morales. The article advances our understanding of the relationship between populism, globalization, and IPE, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between left and right populism and different forms of globalization.
引用
收藏
页码:904 / 934
页数:31
相关论文
共 93 条
  • [1] A POLITICAL THEORY OF POPULISM
    Acemoglu, Daron
    Egorov, Georgy
    Sonin, Konstantin
    [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2013, 128 (02) : 771 - 805
  • [2] [Anonymous], 2012, LUSAKA TIMES 0122
  • [3] Anria S., 2018, When Movements Become Parties: The Bolivian MAS in Comparative Perspective
  • [4] Political Risk Insurance: A New Firm-level Data Set
    Arel-Bundock, Vincent
    Peinhardt, Clint
    Pond, Amy
    [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 2020, 64 (05) : 987 - 1006
  • [5] Remodeling the competition for capital: How domestic politics erases the race to the bottom
    Basinger, SJ
    Hallerberg, M
    [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 2004, 98 (02) : 261 - 276
  • [6] Societal preferences, partisan agents, and monetary policy outcomes
    Bearce, DH
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 2003, 57 (02) : 373 - +
  • [7] A Costly Commitment: Populism, Economic Performance, and the Quality of Bureaucracy
    Bellodi, Luca
    Morelli, Massimo
    Vannoni, Matia
    [J]. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2024, 68 (01) : 193 - 209
  • [8] Globalization and populism in Europe
    Bergh, Andreas
    Karna, Anders
    [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 2021, 189 (1-2) : 51 - 70
  • [9] The Causes of Populism in the West
    Berman, Sheri
    [J]. ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, VOL 24, 2021, 2021, 24 : 71 - 88
  • [10] Bernal Rivera Jose, 2017, KLUWER ARBITRAT 0812