Who Intervenes in Supreme Court Cases in Canada?

被引:2
作者
Mcnabb, Danielle [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Brock Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Plaza Bldg,1812 Sir Isaac Brock Way, St Catharines, ON L2S 3A1, Canada
[2] Queens Univ, Dept Polit Studies, 68 Univ Ave, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada
来源
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE-REVUE CANADIENNE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE | 2023年 / 56卷 / 03期
关键词
legal mobilization; Supreme Court of Canada; civil society; democracy; constitutional law; mobilisation juridique; Cour supreme du Canada; societe civile; democratie; droit constitutionnel; INTEREST GROUP LITIGATION; CHARTER; RIGHTS;
D O I
10.1017/S000842392300046X
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
With the patriation of the Constitution in 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) inherited extraordinary political powers. In response to the Court's expanded power of judicial review, there was a sizeable increase in the number of political actors "intervening" in SCC cases. Scholars of Canadian law and politics are deeply divided on whether civil society participation in the courts-particularly as intervenors-is democratically legitimate. This important debate cannot be settled without an empirical evaluation of who intervenes. This research note provides an analysis of all the Charter cases heard by the SCC between 2013 and 2021. In contrast to the field's dominant theory on interest-group legal mobilization-the Court Party thesis-the findings reveal that equity-deserving interest groups, such as those representing women, have an irregular presence in Court. Instead, powerful actors such as governments and legal associations make up a majority of the "repeat player" intervenors. While further research is warranted, the research note concludes that without the maintenance of sufficient support structures, intervention may be unable to perform a democratizing function. Avec le rapatriement de la Constitution en 1982, la Cour supreme du Canada (CSC) a herite de pouvoirs politiques extraordinaires. En reponse au pouvoir elargi de controle judiciaire de la Cour, le nombre d'acteurs politiques << intervenant >> dans les affaires de la CSC a considerablement augmente. Les specialistes du droit et de la politique au Canada sont profondement divises sur la question de savoir si la participation de la societe civile aux tribunaux - notamment a titre d'intervenants - est democratiquement legitime. Ce debat important ne peut etre tranche sans une evaluation empirique des intervenants. Cette note de recherche fournit une analyse de toutes les affaires relatives a la Charte entendues par la CSC entre 2013 et 2021. Contrairement a la theorie dominante du domaine sur la mobilisation juridique des groupes d'interet - la these du << parti de la Cour >> - les resultats revelent que les groupes d'interet qui meritent l'equite, tels que ceux qui representent les femmes, ont une presence irreguliere a la Cour. Au lieu de cela, des acteurs puissants tels que les gouvernements et les associations juridiques constituent la majorite des intervenants << recidivistes >>. Bien que des recherches supplementaires soient necessaires, la note de recherche conclut que sans le maintien de structures de soutien suffisantes, l'intervention peut etre incapable de remplir une fonction de democratisation.
引用
收藏
页码:715 / 728
页数:14
相关论文
共 35 条
[1]  
Alarie BRD, 2010, OSGOODE HALL LAW J, V48, P381
[2]  
[Anonymous], Trinity Western University v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2018] 2S.C.R.453
[3]  
[Anonymous], R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] 3S.C.R.374
[4]  
[Anonymous], Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] 2S.C.R.293
[5]  
[Anonymous], Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2015] 1S.C.R.245
[6]  
[Anonymous], Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1S.C.R.331
[7]   Interest group litigation and the embedded state: Canada's court challenges program [J].
Brodie, I .
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE-REVUE CANADIENNE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, 2001, 34 (02) :357-376
[8]  
Brodie Ian., 2002, FRIENDS COURT PRIVIL
[9]  
Brodie Ian., 2002, Law, Politics, and the Judicial Processes
[10]  
Bussey Barry W., 2019, Supreme Court Law Review, V90, P265