Does asset encumbrance affect bank risk? Evidence from covered bonds

被引:4
作者
Garcia-Appendini, Emilia [1 ]
Gatti, Stefano [2 ]
Nocera, Giacomo [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Zurich, Dept Banking & Finance, Zurich, Switzerland
[2] Bocconi Univ, Dept Finance, Milan, Italy
[3] Audencia Business Sch, Dept Finance, Nantes, France
[4] Audencia Business Sch, 8 route Joneliere, Nantes 3, France
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
Asset encumbrance; Covered bond; Market discipline; Debt priority; Bank risk; MARKET DISCIPLINE; DEBT; BEHAVIOR; PRIORITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106705
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Theories suggest that asset encumbrance, the ring-fencing of certain assets for protected debtholders, can affect banks' risk-taking and lead to funding instability. We test these hypotheses using a unique, hand -collected dataset on outstanding covered bonds issued by a sample of listed European banks. Our results suggest that the effect of asset encumbrance on risk depends on the proportion of debtholders exerting market discipline and on the bank's liquidity buffers. We deal with concerns regarding omitted variables and reverse causality using several fixed effects estimations and an instrumental variables approach. Our findings can alert policymakers about potential side effects of policy interventions that can induce an increase of asset encumbrance in banks.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )
引用
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页数:18
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