Asymmetric game promotes the emergence of cooperation in dynamic networks

被引:8
作者
Du, Jinming [1 ,2 ]
Wu, Ziren [3 ]
机构
[1] Northeastern Univ, Natl Frontiers Sci Ctr Ind Intelligence & Syst Opt, Shenyang 110819, Peoples R China
[2] Northeastern Univ, Key Lab Data Analyt & Optimizat Smart Ind, Minist Educ, Shenyang 110819, Peoples R China
[3] Northeastern Univ, Coll Informat Sci & Engn, Shenyang 110819, Peoples R China
基金
国家自然科学基金重大项目;
关键词
Evolutionary game theory; Dynamic networks; Symmetry breaking; Coevolution; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; CLIMATE-CHANGE; RISK;
D O I
10.1016/j.knosys.2023.111287
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Individuals in networked social groups often exhibit asymmetry when interacting with each other due to enjoying different amounts of resources and having different numbers of neighbors. In this paper, we study the impact of asymmetric games on the evolution of cooperation in dynamic networks. By constructing linking dynamics, the evolution of network structure is analyzed, and further the coevolution of strategy and network structure is explored. Based on three different contribution modes in the public goods game, it is revealed that compared with symmetric game, asymmetric game may be more conducive to promoting the emergence and maintenance of cooperation, while the emergence of cooperation benefits from the dynamic adjustment of network structure. We investigate the influence of the adjustment rules of dynamic networks on the evolution of cooperation, and show the difference of cooperation level under different social connection preferences. By analyzing the time scale of strategy updating compared with network link adjustment, it is pointed out that faster network evolution is beneficial to cooperation. In addition, we explore the influence of some statistical characteristics of networks on the system evolution.
引用
收藏
页数:9
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