Custom and Law in Transnational Commercial Contracts: A Coevolutionary Perspective

被引:0
作者
Cafaggi, Fabrizio [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Libera Univ Int Sociali Guido Carli luiss, Rome, Italy
[2] Univ Pisa, Pisa, Italy
关键词
commercial contracts; custom; trade usages; lex mercatoria; transnational private regulation; MAGHRIBI TRADERS; ECONOMIC-THEORY; SOFT LAW; FOUNDATIONS; NETWORKS; HARD;
D O I
10.18601/01234366.45.08
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
The article examines the role of custom and trade usages in transnational commercial law. It distinguishes between state and communities-based rules. The validity of the former is grounded on procedural compliance, the validity of the latter on the effectiveness of the rule. It addresses the alternative or complementary nature of custom and law, accounting for the historical perspective. But for a few exceptions, custom and law are complementary and have co-evolved over time. Co -evolution has operated through different mechanisms: cooperation and choice. The analysis examines strengths and weaknesses of the two families of instruments that have permitted to feed law with customary rules.
引用
收藏
页码:209 / 240
页数:32
相关论文
共 117 条
[1]   Hard and soft law in international governance [J].
Abbott, KW ;
Snidal, D .
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 2000, 54 (03) :421-+
[2]  
[Anonymous], 2010, UTAH LAW REV
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2009, CoNN. L. REV.
[4]  
[Anonymous], 1997, INT COMP LAW Q
[5]  
[Anonymous], LEGAL GUIDE UNIFORM, P74
[6]  
[Anonymous], 2021, LEG GUID UN INSTR AR
[7]  
[Anonymous], 1995, L'ordine giuridico medieval
[8]  
[Anonymous], 2006, GRAMMAR SOC NATURE D
[9]   Majoritarian vs. minoritarian defaults [J].
Ayres, I ;
Gertner, R .
STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 1999, 51 (06) :1591-1613
[10]   STRATEGIC CONTRACTUAL INEFFICIENCY AND THE OPTIMAL CHOICE OF LEGAL RULES [J].
AYRES, I ;
GERTNER, R .
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1992, 101 (04) :729-773