Bidirectional supervision: An effective method to suppress corruption and defection under the third party punishment mechanism of donation games

被引：2

作者：

Shi, Zhenyu ^{[1
,2
,4
]}

Wei, Wei ^{[1
,2
,5
]}

Zheng, Hongwei ^{[2
,3
]}

Zheng, Zhiming ^{[1
,2
,5
]}

机构：

[1] Beihang Univ, Sch Math Sci, Beijing, Peoples R China

[2] Minist Educ, Key Lab Math Informat Behav Semant, Beijing, Peoples R China

[3] Beijing Acad Blockchain & Edge Comp, Beijing, Peoples R China

[4] Beihang Univ, Shen Yuan Honors Coll, Beijing, Peoples R China

[5] Zhongguancun Lab, Beijing, Peoples R China

来源：

APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION | 2023年 / 450卷

基金：

北京市自然科学基金; 中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Spatial evolutionary game; Prisoner?s dilemma game; Punishment; Mutilayer network; Corruption; PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME; PROMOTES COOPERATION; NETWORKS; COORDINATION; EVOLUTION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.amc.2023.127970

中图分类号：

O29 [应用数学];

学科分类号：

070104 ;

摘要：

Corruption is a serious problem faced by human society, which significantly affects the ef-ficiency of the third party punishment mechanism. Without intervention, fair umpires will gradually evolve into bribed umpires to maximize its own profits, resulting in a double dilemma of corruption-defection. Therefore, it is worth studying how to suppress corrup-tion through effective intervention mechanisms. In this paper, we propose a bidirectional supervision mechanism in which players could also supervise umpires and give up the games if they find their corresponding umpires are unfavourable for themselves. Five pa-rameters control the whole model. Through Monte Carlo simulations, we reveal the effects of these parameters on the results. More importantly, the bidirectional supervision mech-anism has a significant effect on suppressing corruption and defection. Our results provide a new perspective for exploring how corruption and defection could be suppressed under the third-party punishment mechanism.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：13