Project games

被引：2
作者：
Bilo, Vittorio [1 ]
Gourves, Laurent [2 ]
Monnot, Jerome [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Salento, Dept Math & Phys Ennio Giorgi, Prov Lecce Arnesano,POB 193, I-73100 Lecce, Italy
[2] Univ Paris 09, Univ PSL, CNRS, LAMSADE, Paris, France
来源：
THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE | 2023年 / 940卷
关键词：
Pure Nash equilibria; Price of anarchy; Price of stability; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA; CONGESTION; COMPLEXITY; EXISTENCE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.tcs.2022.10.043
中图分类号：
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号：
081202 ;
摘要：
We consider a strategic game, called project game, where each agent has to choose a project among her own list of available projects. The model includes positive weights expressing the capacity of a given agent to contribute to a given project. The realization of a project produces some reward that has to be allocated to the agents. The reward of a realized project is fully allocated to its contributors according to a simple proportional rule. Existence and computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria is addressed and their efficiency is investigated according to both the utilitarian and the egalitarian social function.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：97 / 111
页数：15
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