Pratibha, intuition, and practical knowledge

In Sanskrit philosophy, the closest analogue of intuition is pratibha. Here, I will focus on the theory of pratibha offered by the Sanskrit grammarian Bhartrhari (fifth century CE). On this account, states of pratibha play two distinct psychological roles. First, they serve as sources of linguistic understanding. They are the states by means of which linguistically competent agents effortlessly understand the meaning of novel sentences. Second, states of pratibha serve as sources of practical knowledge. On the basis of such states, both human and non-human agents unreflectively know which actions they should perform under which circumstances. Given these two roles of pratibha, modern commentators have often claimed that states of pratibha, as understood by Bhartrhari, are intuitions. In this article, I will reconstruct Bhartrhari's view and to explore its consequences, I will argue that, if Bhartrhari's theory of pratibha is right, then a form of human exceptionalism - which makes rationality a unique trait of human beings - becomes difficult to maintain.