This work examines the relationship between Kant's notion of freedom and the legal duty to leave the state of nature and enter the civil state in his theory of law and politics. As opposed to ethical duties, the fulfilment of legal duties can be forced upon a person. Coercion is important in the context of this pa-per because, according to Kant, right is always connected with an authoriza-tion to use coercion. The right of intelligible possession as an acquired right already existing in the state of nature is the basis of the legal duty to leave the state of nature and enter the civil state. The right of intelligible possession, which refers to the possession of external objects, or possession independ-ent of the empirical conditions, implies the duty of all others to refrain from using the objects we first possess, but also the moral authorization of coercion over those who refuse to do so. However, since in the state of nature there is no public authority which enforces the law through general laws, coercion is arbitrary and depends on particular interpretations of legal situations. The ar-bitrariness of coercion implies the possibility that the freedom of the individu-al, which is externally manifested through the right of intelligible possession, will be endangered. For this reason, others can be forced to enter the civil state with me, submitting to the public authority under the same conditions. The public authority makes rights of possession explicit and secures them, and is thus a necessary condition for the fullness of human freedom.
