Empirical analyses of selection and welfare in insurance markets: a self-indulgent survey

被引:3
|
作者
Einav, Liran [1 ,3 ]
Finkelstein, Amy [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] MIT, Cambridge, MA USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
英国科研创新办公室;
关键词
Adverse selection; Asymmetric information; Insurance markets; Welfare analysis; HEALTH-INSURANCE; ADVERSE SELECTION; INFORMATION FRICTIONS; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; PRIVATE INFORMATION; COST; RISK; HETEROGENEITY; COMPETITION; ECONOMICS;
D O I
10.1057/s10713-023-00084-3
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This review article surveys work that has been done using an empirical framework for analyzing selection in insurance markets developed by Einav et al. (Einav et al., Quarterly Journal of Economics 125:877-921, 2010a). We briefly review that framework, and then describe a number of empirical applications that researchers have undertaken across an array of settings in both insurance and credit markets. We also discuss some of the useful extensions to the original framework that others have made and applied. The review is intended to be useful for scholars who may want to apply the framework in their own work on insurance, credit, or other selection markets.
引用
收藏
页码:167 / 191
页数:25
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