Digital Twin-Based Cyber-Attack Detection Framework for Cyber-Physical Manufacturing Systems

被引:29
|
作者
Balta, Efe C. [2 ]
Pease, Michael [1 ]
Moyne, James [2 ]
Barton, Kira [2 ]
Tilbury, Dawn M. [2 ]
机构
[1] Natl Inst Stand & Technol, Gaithersburg, MD USA
[2] Univ Michigan, Dept Mech Engn, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
关键词
Cyberattack; Process control; Manufacturing; Monitoring; Scalability; Industrial Internet of Things; Digital twins; Anomaly detection; control systems; cyberattack; cyber-physical systems; data analysis; digital twins; fault detection; intelligent automation; manufacturing automation; model checking; security; FAULT-DETECTION; SENSOR ATTACKS; SUPPORT; MODEL; SELECTION; SERVICE; DRIVEN; FUTURE;
D O I
10.1109/TASE.2023.3243147
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Smart manufacturing (SM) systems utilize run-time data to improve productivity via intelligent decision-making and analysis mechanisms on both machine and system levels. The increased adoption of cyber-physical systems in SM leads to the comprehensive framework of cyber-physical manufacturing systems (CPMS) where data-enabled decision-making mechanisms are coupled with cyber-physical resources on the plant floor. Due to their cyber-physical nature, CPMS are susceptible to cyber-attacks that may cause harm to the manufacturing system, products, or even the human workers involved in this context. Therefore, detecting cyber-attacks efficiently and timely is a crucial step toward implementing and securing high-performance CPMS in practice. This paper addresses two key challenges to CPMS cyber-attack detection. The first challenge is distinguishing expected anomalies in the system from cyber-attacks. The second challenge is the identification of cyber-attacks during the transient response of CPMS due to closed-loop controllers. Digital twin (DT) technology emerges as a promising solution for providing additional insights into the physical process (twin) by leveraging run-time data, models, and analytics. In this work, we propose a DT framework for detecting cyber-attacks in CPMS during controlled transient behavior as well as expected anomalies of the physical process. We present a DT framework and provide details on structuring the architecture to support cyber-attack detection. Additionally, we present an experimental case study on off-the-shelf 3D printers to detect cyber-attacks utilizing the proposed DT framework to illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach. Note to Practitioners-This work is motivated by developing a general-purpose and extensible digital twin-enabled cyber-attack detection framework for manufacturing systems. Existing works in the field consider specialized attack scenarios and models that may not be extensible in practical manufacturing scenarios. We utilize digital twin (DT) technology as a key enabler to develop a systematic and extensible framework where we identify the abnormality of a resource and detect if the abnormality is due to an attack or an expected anomaly. We provide several remarks on how our proposed framework can extend existing industrial control systems (ICS) and can accommodate further extensions. The presented DTs utilize data-driven machine learning models, physics-based models, and subject matter expert knowledge to perform detection and differentiation tasks in the context of expected anomalies and model-based controllers that control the manufacturing process between multiple setpoints. We utilize a model predictive controller on an off-the-shelf 3D printer to run the process, and stage anomalies and cyber-attacks that are successfully detected by the proposed framework.
引用
收藏
页码:1695 / 1712
页数:18
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Cyber attack estimation and detection for cyber-physical power systems
    Li, Lei
    Wang, Wenting
    Ma, Qiang
    Pan, Kunpeng
    Liu, Xin
    Lin, Lin
    Li, Jian
    APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION, 2021, 400
  • [22] Digital twin-based fault tolerance approach for Cyber-Physical Production System
    Saraeian, Shideh
    Shirazi, Babak
    ISA TRANSACTIONS, 2022, 130 : 35 - 50
  • [23] Experimentation and Implementation of the BFT++ Cyber-Attack Resilience Mechanism for Cyber-Physical Systems
    Keppler, David R.
    Karim, M. Faraz
    Mickelson, Matthew S.
    Mertoguno, J. Sukarno
    ACM TRANSACTIONS ON CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS, 2024, 8 (03)
  • [24] Cyber-attack detection in healthcare using cyber-physical system and machine learning techniques
    Ahmad Ali AlZubi
    Mohammed Al-Maitah
    Abdulaziz Alarifi
    Soft Computing, 2021, 25 : 12319 - 12332
  • [25] A Digital Twin for Cyber-Physical Energy Systems
    Pileggi, Paolo
    Verriet, Jacques
    Broekhuijsen, Jeroen
    van Leeuwen, Coen
    Wijbrandi, Wilco
    Konsman, Mente
    2019 7TH WORKSHOP ON MODELING AND SIMULATION OF CYBER-PHYSICAL ENERGY SYSTEMS (MSCPES), 2019,
  • [26] Architectural framework of digital twin-based cyber-physical production system for resilient rechargeable battery production
    Park, Kyu-Tae
    Park, Yang Ho
    Park, Moon-Won
    Noh, Sang Do
    JOURNAL OF COMPUTATIONAL DESIGN AND ENGINEERING, 2023, 10 (02) : 809 - 829
  • [27] Integrating Cyber-Attack Defense Techniques into Real-Time Cyber-Physical Systems
    Hao, Xiaochen
    Lv, Mingsong
    Zheng, Jiesheng
    Zhang, Zhengkui
    Yi, Wang
    2019 IEEE 37TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER DESIGN (ICCD 2019), 2019, : 237 - 245
  • [28] Differential Evolution-Based Three Stage Dynamic Cyber-Attack of Cyber-Physical Power Systems
    Lu, Kang-Di
    Wu, Zheng-Guang
    Huang, Tingwen
    IEEE-ASME TRANSACTIONS ON MECHATRONICS, 2023, 28 (02) : 1137 - 1148
  • [29] A digital twin for production planning based on cyber-physical systems: A Case Study for a Cyber-Physical System-Based Creation of a Digital Twin
    Biesinger, Florian
    Meike, Davis
    Krass, Benedikt
    Weyrich, Michael
    12TH CIRP CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENT COMPUTATION IN MANUFACTURING ENGINEERING, 2019, 79 : 355 - 360
  • [30] Setpoint Attack Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems
    Lucia, Walter
    Gheitasi, Kian
    Ghaderi, Mohsen
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL, 2021, 66 (05) : 2332 - 2338