Stakeholder Value: A Convenient Excuse for Underperforming Managers?

被引:6
作者
Flugum, Ryan [1 ]
Souther, Matthew E. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Northern Iowa, Coll Business, Cedar Falls, IA USA
[2] Univ South Carolina, Darla Moore Sch Business, Columbia, SC 29208 USA
关键词
CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; CONFERENCE CALLS; BOARD INDEPENDENCE; CAREER CONCERNS; FIRM VALUE; DIRECTORS; INFORMATION; DISCLOSURE; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1017/S0022109023001308
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Firms falling short of earnings expectations are more likely to cite stakeholder-focused objectives in their public communications following earnings announcements. This behavior is consistent with managers preferring to be evaluated by subjective stakeholder-based performance criteria when falling short on objective shareholder-based measures. This increased use of stakeholder language is most evident among firms narrowly missing earnings estimates and appears unrelated to a firm's actual environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-related activity. Stakeholder language appears to influence the evaluation of CEOs; turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for managers citing stakeholder value. Collectively, our findings are consistent with concerns that stakeholder objectives reduce managerial accountability for poor performance.
引用
收藏
页码:135 / 168
页数:34
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