Rule-Following I: The Basic Issues

被引：1
作者：
Reiland, Indrek [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Vienna, Dept Philosophy, Vienna, Austria
[2] Univ Vienna, Dept Philosophy, Univ Str 7, A-1010 Vienna, Austria
来源：
PHILOSOPHY COMPASS | 2024年 / 19卷 / 01期
基金：
奥地利科学基金会;
关键词：
WITTGENSTEIN;
D O I：
10.1111/phc3.12900
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
'Rule-following' is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem both guided and "normatively" constrained by something general in performing particular actions. Understanding the phenomenon is important because of its connection to meaning, representation, and content. This article gives an overview of the philosophical discussion of rule-following. Part I of this two-part contribution is devoted to the basic issues from Wittgenstein to Kripkenstein's skeptical paradox. Part II will be about recent answers to the skeptical paradox and Boghossian's and Wright's new puzzles.
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页数：9
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