Family businesses and debt maturity structure: Focusing on family involvement in governance to explain heterogeneity

被引:8
作者
Ginesti, Gianluca [1 ]
Ossorio, Mario [2 ]
Dawson, Alexandra [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Naples Federico II, Inst, Management, Dept Econ, Monte S Angelo Univ Campus, Naples, Italy
[2] Univ Campania Luigi Vanvitelli, Dept Econ, Naples, Italy
[3] Concordia Univ, 1455 De Maisonneuve Blvd West, Montreal, PQ, Canada
关键词
Debt maturity; Family business; Family involvement; Family governance; Socioemotional wealth; TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS; BOARD-OF-DIRECTORS; SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH; FIRM PERFORMANCE; AGENCY COSTS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; FINANCING DECISIONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfbs.2023.100563
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Understanding family firms' debt maturity structure is important because it plays a key role in making strategic decisions and mitigating agency conflicts. This study investigates the relationship between family involvement in governance and debt maturity structure in family firms by drawing on governance literature and insights from the socioemotional wealth perspective. Based on a sample of non-financial Italian public family firms, comprising 383 firm-year observations, we find differences in the proportion of long-term debt depending on variations in components of family involvement in governance. In particular, later-generation involvement on the board is associated with a lower proportion of long-term debt. Furthermore, family ownership positively moderates this relationship such that the proportion of long-term debt is higher with high family ownership. This study contributes to literature by adding further nuance to our understanding of the heterogeneity of family firms, by considering the relationship between variations in family involvement in governance and debt structure. Our study has practical implications that may inform investors about factors related to family involvement in governance, which are likely to influence debt maturity structure, and thus long-term strategies of family firms.
引用
收藏
页数:13
相关论文
共 137 条
[1]   A theory of friendly boards [J].
Adams, Renee B. ;
Ferreira, Daniel .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2007, 62 (01) :217-250
[2]   CEO Duality, Agency Costs, and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency [J].
Aktas, Nihat ;
Andreou, Panayiotis C. ;
Karasamani, Isabella ;
Philip, Dennis .
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, 2019, 30 (02) :473-493
[3]   How do managerial successions shape corporate financial policies in family firms? [J].
Amore, Mario Daniele ;
Minichilli, Alessandro ;
Corbetta, Guido .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2011, 17 (04) :1016-1027
[4]   Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt [J].
Anderson, RC ;
Mansi, SA ;
Reeb, DM .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2004, 37 (03) :315-342
[5]   Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt [J].
Anderson, RC ;
Mansi, SA ;
Reeb, DM .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2003, 68 (02) :263-285
[6]   Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 [J].
Anderson, RC ;
Reeb, DM .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2003, 58 (03) :1301-1328
[7]   Large shareholders and firm performance - An empirical examination of founding-family ownership [J].
Andres, Christian .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2008, 14 (04) :431-445
[8]   Why Is Family Firms' Internationalization Unique? A Meta-Analysis [J].
Arregle, Jean-Luc ;
Duran, Patricio ;
Hitt, Michael A. ;
van Essen, Marc .
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, 2017, 41 (05) :801-831
[9]   The growth and performance of family businesses during the global financial crisis: The role of the generation in control [J].
Arrondo-Garcia, Ruben ;
Fernandez-Mendez, Carlos ;
Menendez-Requejo, Susana .
JOURNAL OF FAMILY BUSINESS STRATEGY, 2016, 7 (04) :227-237
[10]   Ownership and control structure as determinants of corporate debt maturity:: a panel study of an emerging market [J].
Arslan, Ozgur ;
Karan, Mehmet Baha .
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 2006, 14 (04) :312-324