Historical Representative Assembly Experiences and Constitutionalism Today

被引:1
作者
Pavlik, Jamie Bologna [1 ]
Young, Andrew T. [2 ]
机构
[1] Texas Tech Univ, Agr & Appl Econ, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA
[2] Texas Tech Univ, Rawls Coll Business, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA
关键词
Constitutional economics; Constitutionalism; Representative assemblies; Medieval and early modern; Limited government; P00; P16; P48; H1; N40; COLLECTIVE MEMORY; INSTITUTIONS; CONSENT;
D O I
10.1057/s41294-023-00228-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Successful constitutionalism is characterized by de jure Constitutional provisions de facto binding political agents. A growing literature seeks to quantify cross-country variation in Constitutional compliance and explore its determinants (e.g., Law and Versteeg in Calif Law Rev 101(C):863-952, 2013; Gutmann et al. in University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics Working Paper 2022 No. 57, 2022; Voigt in Int J Const Law 19(5):1778-1809, 2021). We explore long-institutional memories of representative assemblies as a determinant. We employ Bologna Pavlik and Young's (Econ Gov 21(2):133-186, 2020, South Econ J 88(1):414-448, 2021) measure of medieval/Early Modern assembly experiences. Assembly experiences are positively associated with Constitutional compliance. However, breaking them down into tax veto and spending prerogative experiences, the former is positively related to compliance; the latter is negatively related.
引用
收藏
页码:665 / 680
页数:16
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