Nonequilibrium statistical mechanics of money/energy exchange models

被引:2
作者
Miao, Maggie [1 ,2 ]
Makarov, Dmitrii E. [1 ,2 ]
Blom, Kristian [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Austin, Dept Chem, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[2] Univ Texas Austin, Oden Inst Computat Engn & Sci, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[3] Max Planck Inst Multidisciplinary Sci, Math bioPhys Grp, D-37077 Gottingen, Germany
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
econophysics; transition paths; Pareto law; DISTRIBUTIONS; WEALTH; MONEY; INCOME; PROOF;
D O I
10.1088/1751-8121/ad369b
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
Many-body dynamical models in which Boltzmann statistics can be derived directly from the underlying dynamical laws without invoking the fundamental postulates of statistical mechanics are scarce. Interestingly, one such model is found in econophysics and in chemistry classrooms: the money game, in which players exchange money randomly in a process that resembles elastic intermolecular collisions in a gas, giving rise to the Boltzmann distribution of money owned by each player. Although this model offers a pedagogical example that demonstrates the origins of Boltzmann statistics, such demonstrations usually rely on computer simulations. In fact, a proof of the exponential steady-state distribution in this model has only become available in recent years. Here, we study this random money/energy exchange model and its extensions using a simple mean-field-type approach that examines the properties of the one-dimensional random walk performed by one of its participants. We give a simple derivation of the Boltzmann steady-state distribution in this model. Breaking the time-reversal symmetry of the game by modifying its rules results in non-Boltzmann steady-state statistics. In particular, introducing 'unfair' exchange rules in which a poorer player is more likely to give money to a richer player than to receive money from that richer player, results in an analytically provable Pareto-type power-law distribution of the money in the limit where the number of players is infinite, with a finite fraction of players in the 'ground state' (i.e. with zero money). For a finite number of players, however, the game may give rise to a bimodal distribution of money and to bistable dynamics, in which a participant's wealth jumps between poor and rich states. The latter corresponds to a scenario where the player accumulates nearly all the available money in the game. The time evolution of a player's wealth in this case can be thought of as a 'chemical reaction', where a transition between 'reactants' (rich state) and 'products' (poor state) involves crossing a large free energy barrier. We thus analyze the trajectories generated from the game using ideas from the theory of transition paths and highlight non-Markovian effects in the barrier crossing dynamics.
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页数:27
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