Foreign shareholders and executive compensation stickiness: Evidence from China

被引：6
|
作者：
Zhao, Qicheng [1 ]
Hu, Changyu [2 ]
Ma, Ruiyun [3 ]
Yin, Yugang [1 ]
Liu, Yahui [1 ]
机构：
[1] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Chengdu, Peoples R China
[2] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China
[3] Huaibei Normal Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Huaibei, Peoples R China
来源：
FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS | 2024年 / 59卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Foreign ownership Executive compensation stickiness Individualistic cultural imprint Supervision costs;
D O I：
10.1016/j.frl.2023.104790
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This research examines the impact of foreign shareholders on executive compensation stickiness by analyzing China's listed companies from 2007 to 2022. The analysis finds that foreign shareholder ownership leads to an increase in executive pay stickiness by increasing upward pay sensitivity. The individualistic cultural imprint and supervision costs play a crucial role in this mechanism. Additionally, the positive impact of foreign ownership on executive compensation stickiness is more significant in the sample where foreign shareholders are the actual controllers and the internal and external monitoring is weak. Furthermore, the hypothesis regarding the positive effect of executive compensation stickiness is validated by identifying the increasing of firm innovation and value.
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页数：12
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